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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ducted in the schools but only searches for evidence of crimi-
nal conduct. The decision does not mean that teachers may no
longer search even for evidence of a criminal violation; it
means only that compliance with the procedural safeguards
guaranteed by the fourth amendment must be assured.
Kay Cowden Medlin
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AUTHORITY
TO ISSUE "JOHN DOE" SUMMONSES ON BANKS
A routine report from the Federal Reserve Bank to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in 1970 noted the receipt of
two $20,000 deposits of deteriorated $100 bills from another
bank.1 In an investigation of that transaction, the IRS issued
a "John Doe" summons, 2 directed to the bank which received
the money originally, to learn its source.3 The Sixth Circuit,
noting that the IRS lacked authority to summon a third party
bank's records except in an investigation of a specified tax-
payer, reversed the district court order of compliance with
the summons. 4 The government appealed, and the United
States Supreme Court held that the IRS has authority under
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 7601-025 to issue, pursuant to a
ness of lockers; no particular student is singled out in advance; a minor
sanction or no sanction for failing to meet the prescribed standards. (2.)
Search for evidence of violation of a school regulation for which a sanction
such as expulsion may be imposed; focus is on one student. (3.) Search for
evidence of a violation of a school regulation which is, in substance, also a
criminal violation. (4.) Search undertaken not to enforce a school rule, but to
obtain evidence that a student has committed a criminal offense.
1. The deterioration suggested a long period of storage, triggering the
IRS's interest in whether the related transactions had been reported for tax
purposes. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 142-43 (1975).
2. Commonly refers to a summons directed to a third party seeking
disclosure of information as to, or the identity of, some unknown taxpayer(s).
3. Originally the IRS sought whatever records would provide informa-
tion on the source of the money. The receiving bank refused to comply, and
the Service applied for enforcement in federal district court under INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 7604. To avoid unnecessary disclosures, the court narrowed
the request to all slips showing cash deposits of $20,000 or of $5,000 or more
involving $100 bills for the pertinent one-month period. United States v.
Bisceglia, 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. $ 9474 (E.D. Ky. 1972) (memorandum opinion).
4. Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973).
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7601 provides: "The secretary or his delegate
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"legitimate interest in large or unusual financial transac-
tions, especially those involving cash,"'6 a "John Doe" sum-
mons requiring a bank to identify the person or persons in-
volved. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
The IRS traditionally has had the power to summon third
parties who have knowledge and records relating to the tax
liability of a specified individual or group under investiga-
tion. 7 In United States v. Powell 8 the Supreme Court held that
the probable cause standard does not apply to IRS sum-
monses and that the fourth amendment requires only that
the investigation be pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that
the inquiry be relevant to that purpose, that the information
sought not be in IRS possession already, and that requisite
administrative steps be followed.9 Additional constitutional
constraints on IRS authority to summon a bank's records in
an investigation of its customer have been based on require-
ments of reasonableness. 10 The bulk of taxpayer challenges of
shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the
Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal
revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who
may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having
the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is
imposed." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7602 provides: "For the purpose of
ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has
been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue
tax . . . or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is
authorized-1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which
may be relevant or material to such inquiry; (2) To summon the person liable
for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such
person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account
containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or
required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time
and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records,
or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or
material to such inquiry; and (3) To take such testimony of the person con-
cerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry."
6. 420 U.S. at 149.
7. E.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 295 F. 142 (S.D. Ala. 1924),
aff'd, 267 U.S. 576 (1925) (affirming IRS authority to summon a bank in an
investigation of a named taxpayer).
8. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
9. Id. at 57-58. The court limits its inquiry to these four elements unless a
valid claim of abuse of process exists, i.e., IRS bad faith or harassment of a
taxpayer.
10. See discussion in text at notes 50-53, infra; e.g., United States v.
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administrative subpoenas have alleged that the investigation
has an improper purpose, i.e., to uncover evidence for possible
criminal prosecution; in "John Doe" adjudications the scope
of § 7602 authority, i.e., whether the statute contemplates a
summons to discover an unknown individual in an admittedly
civil investigation, has been the question.11
Early decisions involving "John Doe" summonses concen-
trated on the necessity that particular persons be under in-
vestigation, and disapproved their use in exploratory
searches when no grounds existed to suspect any tax liabil-
ity.12 In McDonough v. Lambert 3 the court denied enforce-
ment of a summons directing disclosure of the identity of the
recipient of a $10,000 payment which would not affect the tax
liability of the principal taxpayer. The court held the deduc-
tion was immaterial, saying the summons statute did not give
the IRS authority to procure evidence that might be material
to the tax return of someone unknown to it and who may or
may not have made a return.1 4 Tillotson v. Boughner15
affirmed the reasoning of the McDonough court. The Seventh
Circuit enforced a summons on an attorney who paid over
$200,000 in back taxes to the IRS for an anonymous indi-
vidual, since the investigation involved a particular
taxpayer-only his name was unknown.16
In a series of decisions pursuant to the Tax Preparer
Project, 17 the courts shifted the emphasis of their inquiry in
"John Doe" summons cases from the search for a particular
Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 488 F.2d 953, 959 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and re-
manded, 421 U.S. 943 (1975).
11. E.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (IRS summons
may be used in investigations if issued in good faith and prior to a recom-
mendation for criminal prosecution); Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th
Cir. 1966); see Comment, IRS Subpoena Power to Investigate Unknown Tax-
payers, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 185-87 (1975).
12. Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934) (denied enforcement of
summons seeking names of beneficiaries of certain trusts, solely because the
unusual size and form interested the Service); In re International Corp. Co., 5
F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); see Comment, supra note 11, at 186. Contra,
Miles v. United Founders Corp., 5 F. Supp. 413 (D.N.J. 1933).
13. 94 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1938).
14. Id. at 841.
15. 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964).
16. Id. at 516.
17. Those commercial tax preparers who failed to complete a test return
accurately were investigated and the names of their clients sought. Com-
ment, supra note 11, at 187.
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person under investigation to a balancing of the probability of
the Service's uncovering outstanding tax liability against the
burden of compliance on the summoned third party. 18 In the
leading case, the Fourth Circuit required a commercial tax
preparer to divulge the names of his clients for the past three
years if the information was not otherwise accessible to the
IRS.1 9 While this holding permits what courts previously had
called an "exploratory search," 20 the opinion contains lan-
guage which weakens its authority as a blanket approval of
"John Doe" summonses. 21 The court denied enforcement, on
the grounds of overbreadth and vagueness, of that part of the
summons which sought all of the preparer's related work over
a three-year period because the IRS is not given an "unre-
stricted license to rummage through the office files of an
accountant in the hope of perchance discovering information
that would result in increased tax liabilities for some as yet
unidentified client. 22
Adding to confusion in this area, another line of appellate
decisions 23 refused to enforce "John Doe" summonses, based
on a perceived distinction between the exploratory purpose of
§ 7601 and the separate investigatory purpose of § 7602.24 The
18. See, e.g., United States v. Berkowitz, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 946 (1975). Accord, United States v. Armour,
376 F. Supp. 318 (D. Conn. 1974).
'19. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
20. See Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934); In re International
Corp. Co., 5 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
21. The court states that § 7602 only allows summoning information
relating to a particular return or person and "does not authorize the use of
open ended Joe Doe summonses." Id. at 755. The court also indicated that
earlier "John Doe" summonses involving one or a few taxpayers did not
necessarily support subpoenas covering large numbers as here. Later Tax
Preparer cases rely on Theodore as precedent for their enforcement of similar
"John Doe" summonses for client lists, without discussing its confused
reasoning. United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973) (relying on
Theodore at district court level); United States v. Berkowitz, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (1973), rehearing denied per
curiam, 504 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1974).
22. 479 F.2d at 754.
23. Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, United
States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141 (1975); United States v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 943 (for
reconsideration in light of Bisceglia), aff'd on remand, 518 F.2d 747 (1975) (per
curiam).
24. Bisceglia v. United States, 486 F.2d at 709; United States v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 488 F.2d at 960. This distinction is supported by dicta in
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Fifth Circuit in United States v. Humble Oil and Refining Co. 25
emphasized that the summons was pursuant to a research
project, not an investigation as § 7602 requires. 26 Although
their reasoning echoed earlier constraints against explora-
tory searches, 27 here the IRS was acting in an information-
gathering capacity to test compliance with tax regulations in
selected areas, rather than conducting an investigation,
which is an examination of a specific suspected person or tax
liability.
A survey of past "John Doe" summons jurisprudence re-
veals that lower courts have focused on several factors in
judging the validity of these summonses: the likelihood of
outstanding tax liability,28 the burden of compliance on the
third party being subpoenaed, 29 the number of unknown tax-
payers, 30 the nature of the inquiry, i.e., whether exploratory
research or a particularized investigation, 31 and which par-
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1971) (§ 7601 imposes a duty
to canvass and to inquire while § 7602 aids the separate investigatory duty).
Contra, Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964) (dictum); United
States v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 369 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Miss. 1973) (enforced
exploratory summons for names based on reading § 7601 and § 7602 together).
25. 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974).
26. 488 F.2d at 954-56; accord, United States v. Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318
(D. Conn. 1974) (enforced "John Doe" summons where the purpose was inves-
tigatory and not an exploratory search).
27. See note 20, supra.
28. E.g., United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 488 F.2d 953, 955 (5th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1973) (incorrectly
completed sample return is a good reason to expect outstanding tax laibility
in all tax preparer cases); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964)
(anonymous payment of taxes very suspicious).
29. In all previous cases enforcing "John Doe" summonses the burden of
complying was light, especially when compared to the burden of discovering
the identities through other means. E.g., United States v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 518 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1975) (rehearing) (§§ 760i and 7602 do not authorize
IRS to force private citizens to do its research); United States v. Theodore,
479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); accord, United States v. Williams, 337 F. Supp.
1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal dismissed and vacated as moot, 486 F.2d 1397 (2d
Cir. 1972).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 151 (1975) (concur-
ring opinion); United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir.
1974); Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (D. Conn. 1974).
31. E.g., United States v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 747 (5th Cir.
1975) (per curiam), aff'g 488 F.2d 953 (1974); Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596
(W.D. Pa. 1934); see United States v. Security Bank & Trust Co., 473 F.2d 638
(5th Cir. 1973) (government burden to make some showing that summons is
ty's liability is under investigation.3 2 Although refusing to
invalidate "John Doe" summonses on a per se basis, pre-
Bisceglia courts generally refused to give them a wholesale
endorsement.
33
The instant case, in enforcing the use of a "John Doe"
summons to identify the person or persons who deposited the
deteriorated bills, erases the distinction made in the circuit
court decisions. 34 To support the majority opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Burger characterized § 7601 as investigatory rather than
exploratory and read § 7602 conjunctively to aid in this func-
tion, 35 ignoring the traditional distinction made between §
7601 as authorizing exploratory research, pursuant to a gen-
eral duty to canvass, 36 and § 7602 as a tool to aid in investiga-
tions aimed at ascertaining the correctness of a given return
or determining the tax liability of any specified person.37 The
dissent correctly remarks that the majority of past "John
Doe" summonses were enforced only when issued incident to
ongoing and particularized investigations in which a reason-
able possibility of outstanding tax liability existed.3 8 Since the
relevant to an investigation not met). Disapproval of what the courts termed
"exploratory fishing expeditions" implies consideration of this factor. E.g.,
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); United States v. Theo-
dore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973).
32. Courts refuse disclosure of names unless they are relevant to the
precipitating IRS investigation. E.g., McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F.2d 838 (1st
Cir. 1938); United States v. Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (D. Conn. 1974).
33. Cf. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (D. Conn. 1974) (unknown taxpayer can be
sufficiently identifiable to be subject to an IRS investigation, and resulting §
7602 summons).
34. 420 U.S. at 150. Seven Justices specifically rejected the Sixth Circuit's
conclusion that § 7602 presupposes an already identified person.
35. The Chief Justice stressed the statutory language by describing §
7601 as a permit "to investigate and inquire after all persons ... who may be
liable to pay any internal revenue tax . . ." and § 7602 authorization, for the
summoning of "any . . . person," as an aid in this investigatory function. 420
U.S. at 149. Accord, Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 369 F. Supp. 6 (S.D. Miss. 1973).
36. See discussion in text at note 23, supra.
37. 420 U.S. at 156-59 (dissenting opinion). Statutory history and the
traditional separation of § 7602 from § 7601 before 1954 support this distinc-
tion. 420 U.S. at 155 n.1.
38. 420 U.S. at 158. The majority stated that their reading of § 7602 was
"inconsistent with an interpretation that would limit the issuance of sum-
monses to investigations which have already focused upon a particular re-
turn, a particular named person, or a particular potential tax liability." 420
U.S. at 149 (dictum).
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subpoena here was admittedly "the initial step in an investi-
gation which might lead to nothing . . .-39 Justice Stewart
fears the majority rationale could be used to support investi-
gations into any tfansaction the IRS deems interesting and
with possible tax consequences. 40
As additional support, the majority characterizes the
IRS's investigatory function as inquisitorial 4' and stresses
the existing safeguard of having the federal district courts as
the only means of enforcing a contested summons. 42 However,
beyond affirming the duty to determine if a legitimate inves-
tigation is being conducted and whether the summons is
broader than necessary, 43 the Court provides no clear
guidelines for future evaluations of "John Doe" summonses.
The decision leaves summoned banks in a quandary. For
all practical purposes any challenges to the summons must be
made by the bank," requiring expenditures of its own money
to contest or comply. The extent, or even the existence, of any
duty of the bank to its customers to maintain the privacy and
integrity of its records is undefined. 45 Liability to customers
39. Id. at 143.
40. Id. at 154.
41. The court compares this function to that of the grand jury, an anal-
ogy which, although common, is usually made when discussing the nature
and not the limits of IRS authority to inquire by administrative summons.
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (as support for principle of no
probable cause requirement to enforce IRS summons); United States v. Mor-
ton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 176
(5th Cir. 1967). One notable distinguishing factor is the constitutional basis of
the grand jury as opposed to the statutory basis of the IRS summons author-
ity. Comment, supra note 11, at 193; cf. United States v. O'Connor, 118 F.
Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953).
42. 420 U.S. at 146, 151. Statutes requiring court enforcement are at INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 7402(b), 7604.
43. 420 U.S. at 151.
44. Due to the nature of "John Doe" subpoenas, taxpayer intervention is
highly unlikely as well as self-defeating. Whether the taxpayer can challenge
subpoenas directed to a bank for records pertaining to his transactions is
doubtful. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971), restricts discretion-
ary taxpayer intervention in IRS enforcement proceedings in the district
courts to those instances in which a claim is made of: (1) privilege (no bank-
depositor privilege exists, Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966)), (2)
improper criminal purpose (lower courts require the summons to be solely for
criminal investigation or to come after recommendation for prosecution,
United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1972), which is
unlikely in situations where the IRS is unaware of the taxpayer's identity).
45. See Flippen, The Internal Revenue Service Summons: An Unrea-
1080 [Vol. 36
does not result from obeying a valid IRS summons, 46 but
whether compliance with a summons later proven invalid
may result in liability to affected depositors is unsettled.
4 7
To compound its problem, the bank has only a limited
ability to attack a "John Doe" summons; it cannot assert the
taxpayer depositor's rights, 48  nor claim any corporate
privilege against self-incrimination. 49 Summoned banks have
been most successful in defeating enforcement when they
challenged summonses on fourth amendment grounds as too
indefinite for the bank to locate the material easily 5° or as
overbroad for their purpose, 51 or on fifth amendment grounds
that they are so burdensome as to amount to a prohibited
taking.5 2 More often, however, these attacks result in the
sonable Expense Burden on Banks and an Invasion of Deporsitors' Privacy?,
12 AM. Bus. L.J. 249 (1975); Mortimer, The IRS Summons and the Duty
of Confidentiality: A Hobson's Choice for Bankers-Revisited, 92 BANKING
L.J. 832 (1975).
46. United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.
1974); Brunwasser v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 14 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 6066
(W.D. Penn. 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 986
(1966).
47. Flippen, supra note 45, at 841.
48. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974);
United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1974).
49. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974).
50. E.g., United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973) (summons
for all work over three-year period too vague and too broad); United States v.
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
921 (1968) (portion of summons seeking all records relative to other transac-
tions too indefinite); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 535 (5th
Cir. 1947).
51. E.g., United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1973); Venn v.
United States, 400 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1968); First Nat'l Bank v. United States,
160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947) (sifting some 6,000,000 items held too broad);
McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937) (search
is unreasonable only if out of proportion to end sought). This fourth amend-
ment limitation can be equated with the relevancy and materiality require-
ments in § 7602 itself and in Powell. See United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp.
857 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
52. There is a point at which compliance becomes too expensive. E.g.,
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716 (W.D. Ark. 1959) ($30,000
cost held too burdensome). But see United States v. Jones, 351 F. Supp. 132,
133 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (bank should bear cost of compliance as a normal, antici-
pated, operating expense); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385
F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1967) (enforced summons for four depositors' records cover-
ing four years, bank offered no solid proof of cost, and IRS offered to lend
copying equipment and perform search itself on the premises).
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district courts' merely narrowing the scope of the summons to
fit these constitutional limitations, as the district court did in
the instant case. 53 The Powell requirements 54 have afforded
another possible avenue of attack. Bisceglia seems to equate
the Powell requirement that the investigation be pursuant to
a legitimate purpose with a "legitimate investigation,"5 5 i.e.,
one within the scope of § 7602 authorization, thus extending
the limits to encompass discovery of the author of an unusual
transaction.
The lower courts now must struggle to fashion a workable
standard by which to test these summonses. Although the
Bisceglia majority uses expansive dictum which seemingly
opens the door to further exploratory type summonses,5 6 the
concurrence explains the holding by a consideration of the
same factors weighed in earlier "John Doe" subpoenas.57 In
an early reaction to Bisceglia in United States v. Humble Oil
and Refining Co.,5s the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of a
"John Doe" summons specifically in light of the Supreme
Court decision. The court read Bisceglia restrictively, confin-
ing it to its facts, and weighed the factors stressed by the
earlier cases: there were no grounds to suspect the existence
of unpaid taxes, the summons was pursuant to a research
project instead of an investigation of one specific transaction,
and the burden of compliance was too great compared to
possible tax gain.
After Bisceglia, just what showing of proof is required to
enforce disclosure of a customer's identity from a bank is not
53. 72-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9474 (E.D. Ky. 1972). The bank did not claim the
summons in Bisceglia was burdensome before the Supreme Court. 420 U.S. at
143.
54. See text at note 9, supra.
55. Compare 420 U.S. at 146 with 420 U.S. at 151.
56. The Chief Justice declares that earlier "John Doe" cases do not
necessarily define the limits on IRS summons power. 420 U.S. at 149. The
court in essence notes only one statutory limitation, that there be a specific
investigation, on the scope of § 7602 subpoenas. See 420 U.S. at 149-51; United
States v. Harper, 397 F. Supp. 983, 994 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (dictum).
57. See text at notes 28-32, supra. In view of the admittedly extraordi-
nary and suspicious facts, Justice Blackmun stressed: the strong possibility
of outstanding tax liability involving one particular taxpayer, compliance
was not burdensome, no other reasonable means were available for the IRS
to investigate, and the summons was not pursuant to a research project but a
genuine particularized investigation. 420 U.S. at 151-52.
58. 518 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
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clear.5 9 If existing principles covering subpoenaes are ex-
tended to cover this area,60 the courts will require the IRS to
show a reasonable expectation that the depositors' names will
shed light on an investigation into possible tax liability,
rather than provide information for a mere research project,
and will weigh that expectation against the burden of com-
pliance on the bank.61
Henry J. Miltenberger, Jr.
OVERDRAFT LIABILITY OF JOINT ACCOUNT COSIGNATORIES
In 1974 the Louisiana legislature enacted a portion of the
Uniform Commercial Code' as Title 10 of the Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes and entitled it the Commercial Laws. 2 One of
the purposes of the adoption was to promote uniformity with
other jurisdictions with respect to commercial paper and cer-
tain commercial transactions. 3 The manner in which the
jurisprudence of different states has approached the liability,
under Article 4 of the U.C.C., of joint checking account de-
positors for overdrafts drawn by their cosignatories should
prove a useful guide to Louisiana practitioners and courts in
59. In Humble the IRS admitted the crucial facts on the stand, an oc-
currence not usually available. 488 F.2d at 955.
60. See United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968).
61. See, e.g., discussion in text supra at notes 18-21; United States v.
Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (D. Conn. 1974). Precedent exists for evaluating
administrative summonses by use of a balancing process. E.g., Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (weighing the public and
private interests involved); United States v. Williams, 337 F. Supp. 1114
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (specifically weighed the burden of compliance against the
likelihood of uncovering tax liability and denied enforcement).
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 1972 Official Text, The American Law
Institute-National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.I.
2. La. Acts 1974, No. 92 § 1.
3. Id.: "AN ACT-To amend the Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding
thereto a new Title 10 entitled Commercial Laws, relating to commercial
paper and certain commercial transactions, contracts and other documents
concerning them,.... to promote uniformity of the law with respect thereto ..."
(emphasis added). To achieve the desired uniformity Louisiana courts should
look to other states' application of the U.C.C. This will not be possible when a
change was made in the U.C.C. text to conform with existing Louisiana
jurisprudence. E.g., LA. R.S. 10:4-402 (Supp. 1974).
1976] NOTES 1083
